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Abstract—Device-to-Device (D2D) communication is a 
promising technology that facilitates the deployment of devices 
to provide extended coverage where devices can act as user or 
relays. However, introducing such technology where the user 
can act as semi-intelligent relays, open a wide range of security 
threats, specifically, in terms of confidentiality and integrity. 
Another key issue of these devices is the limited computational 
and storage capabilities. Thus, to address the above challenges, 
this paper proposed a computationally lightweight crypto 
system based on Elliptic curve and ElGamal over public-key 
infrastructure (EEoP). It uses ECC for creation of keys while 
uses ElGamal for encryption and decryption over public-key 
infrastructure. Mathematical analysis shows that EEoP ensures 
the confidentiality and integrity of the communication. 
Performance analysis shows that proposed scheme 
outperformed the baseline protocols. The proposed crypto 
system can be used in relay-based communication. 
 
Index Terms—Elliptic Curve Cryptography; Elgamal 
Cryptography; Public Key Infrastructure; Security Threats. 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
 
Due to lack of physical boundaries, all sorts of wireless 
communications are always prone to security threats. 
Recently, with the advent of long term evolutions-advanced 
(LTE-A) and 5th generations (5G) cellular networks, device 
to device (D2D) communication become very popular 
amongst the research based society. Unlike mobile adhoc 
networks, social networks, opportunistic networks etc. where 
involvement of base stations (BS) is extremely not required 
(infrastructure less networks), D2D communication do 
require BS. However, in multihop D2D communication, 
intermediate small devices have taken BS role. These small 
devices are mobile stations or user equipment and can act as 
semi-intelligent relays. These architecture is similar to 
current relay-based architecture, (e.g. if no relays involve 
IEEE 802.16e and if relays involve IEEE 802.16j) where such 
relays can act as transparent relays (amplify and forward) and 
semi-intelligent (semi-transparent) relays (decode and 
forward). These relays are in the shape of roadside unit in 
vehicular networks or deployed in buses of buildings to 
support small cells. Power, storage, computational 
capabilities and communication overhead are somehow not a 
critical challenge. However, in D2D communications, user 
equipment or mobile stations can act as semi- intelligent relay 
devices under the supervisions of BS, where power, storage, 
computational capabilities and communication overhead are 
one of the critical challenge. Inclusion of such semi-
intelligent devices create a severe security concerns amongst 
the researchers of D2D communication. The current security 
measures of relay-based architecture is not applicable to D2D 
communications due to above-mentioned critical challenges. 
Secondly, D2D communication is prone to impersonation, 
where the adversary can create replay attacks, which 
consequently generate either denial of service attack or Man 
in the middle (M-I-T-M) attack. In nutshell, integrity 
(DOS/Replay Attack) and confidentially (M-I-T-M attack) 
are the main security requirements with low power, storage, 
computational capabilities and communication overhead as a 
critical challenge. Thus, a security measure is required to 
fulfil above mentioned security requirements and critical 
challenges.  
This paper proposed an elgamal based elliptic curve crypto 
system with PKI infrastructure. Elliptic curve cryptosystem 
is proven to be lightweight with less power consumption is 
used to create the optimum keys. Elgamal is mature form of 
diffie-helmen(DH) to efficiently and securely share the key 
while PKI is used for encryption and decryption of data. 
There are number of security algorithms are proposed to 
mitigate these challenges. However, this paper does not 
consider those security algorithms that require bigger key size 
and require high computational costs. There are a number of 
schemes presented for security and authentication for low 
power devices. Like, Algebric Eraser [1] that works on 
designing security protocol for Near Field Communication 
(NFC) and Radio Frequency identification (RFID). It requires 
a trusted third party to set up the secret key and authenticity 
between communicating devices. NTRU [2] is another 
technique receiving much attention recently has focused on 
the security of small devices and have better security but 
require a larger key size (typically of few kilobits) and 
requires higher computation. Shen, W. et.al [3] presents a DH 
based authentication scheme, where two mobile users can 
setup a key through fewer numbers of steps than normal DH 
scheme. The proposed scheme was tested in between two 
smart phones and was able to do mutual authentication thus 
avoiding M-I-T-M attack. Reddy et.al [4] present an elliptic 
curve cryptography based authentication scheme where a 
lightweight hash function is used such as XOR and 
demonstrates that it can avoid DoS, M-I-T-M attack as well 
as impersonation attack. Reddy et.al [5] propose a scheme 
based on Burrows-Abadi-Needham logic to avoid M-I-T-M 
and replay attacks. This approach uses biometric to identify 
the device users and contact it with elliptic curve hash 
function in order to perform the authentication. The scheme 
shows it outperforms other schemes identified in the 
literature. For Confidentiality, the symmetric key can be used 
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but sharing of keys, and their authentication poses a great 
challenge. For this DH and RSA was designed to solve the 
key sharing problem but with advancement in processing 
power and computational advancements, it was shown that 
smaller key sizes are not secure against even brute force 
attacks, especially with the advent of quantum computers [6]. 
Lauter [7] proved that elliptic curves (EC) [8] can be used 
with DH. EC is computationally less expensive, and their 
usage in DH and RSA can make the solution for Security that 
is vulnerable to quantum attacks. Lauter showed that a key 
size of 283 bits in EC is equivalent to 3072 bits in RSA or 
DH. Elliptic Curve Diffie-Hellman (ECDH) a standard made 
by NIST [9] was proved mathematically to be more secure 
than their predecessors were and was lightweight. Liu et.al 
[10] present an ECC based library for securing the IoT 
Devices with two different version (1) high speed (2) less 
memory consumption. Both techniques are proven to secure 
against timing attacks. Kim et.al [11] presented an 
asymmetric scheme for broadcasting in order to achieve low 
computation overhead and complexity. It used broadcast 
encryption scheme and forward was done in grouping for 
keys. It was also based on ECC. This technique proved too 
efficiently lighter than other key sharing schemes. 
Laiphrakpam and Khumanthem [12] presented the DH with 
ECC using a simple hash algorithm for secure transmission 
of images using Arnold’s transform for encryption. The 
resultant algorithm provides confidentiality and also proved 
strong against Brute force attack. Sedidi and Kumar [13] did 
a) Diffie-Hellman key exchange algorithm using normal 
version, (b) using the ACK/NACK messages for delivery of 
packet to base station (c) Macro station sent a verification 
code to verify the reception of data and provide 
authentication. It was shown that techniques were able to 
mitigate M-I-T-M attack as well as the problem of key 
distribution. Xi et.al [14] also highlighted the issues that can 
occur in device-to-device communication and it emphasizes 
on the requirement of central control. It uses receive signal 
strength, channel state information to design the key, and uses 
an algorithm based on DH in order to do the key management 
and sharing. It has proven to be a good defense against M-I-
T-M attack. Raju et.al [15], presented an algorithm for 
security of traffic routing and discuss a variation of ECC with 
ElGamal, ECDH and ECC with RSA. It also showed that 
ECC proved to be best option. Dake and Ighare [16] presented 
an algorithm with ECC and ElGamal and compared with 
ELGamal scheme to prove that usage of ECC with ElGamal 
is a best option. The comparison was only done in terms of 
space and time. Jung et.al [17] used the idea of DH and 
Public-key infrastructure to achieve the encryption and 
authentication. It also did management of keys using DH.  
Semi-intelligent relays will have lower computational 
power compared to normal BS thus will require a scheme that 
is lightweight, energy-efficient and can provide security 
against major well-known attacks. Present security schemes 
are mostly based on usage of DH algorithm while EEoP is 
based on Elgamal that overcomes the problems faced with 
DH. Present security techniques only uses ECC but in some 
cases, focuses on combination of ECC + DH while EEoP use 
ECC with variable key size depending on the use case and is 
provably secure against quantum attacks.  Present security 
techniques focuses on mitigating M-I-T-M attack or DoS 
attack but EEoP also focuses on mitigating the interleaving 
attack along with other attacks. Moreover, EEoP is based on 
PKI that current security algorithm does not consider.    
Section below provides a scheme for overcoming all 
identified problems. Section II presents a system model while 
Section III present tour proposed EEoP cryptosystem. Section 
IV present discussion and analysis of EEoP scheme along 
with security verification of the system while Section V 
presents the conclusion. 
   
II. SYSTEM MODEL 
 
Figure 1 shows the system model in which Multihop Relay 
Base Station (MRBS) provides communication facility to all 
nodes to use the network and its services. In order to 
communicate each node or user should authenticate with each 
other. This model is based on dual-authentication. Our 
assumption is that first all semi-intelligent relays should 
register with CA (Certification Authority) and obtained their 
public and private key pair. The relays will provide 
connectivity as well as authenticity to devices 𝐷 to do secure 
communication.  
 
 
Figure 1: Showing System model diagram for proposed solution 
 
MRBS broadcasts the Elliptic curve 𝐸 and basepoint 𝐵 
after each interval of 𝑡 seconds. 𝐸 and 𝐵  are only of concern 
for semi intelligent relays 𝑅 that have capabilities of 
authentication and secure communication. It also distributes 
the load of MRBS for handling multiple devices. The 
question may arise about the rouge relay station. Each 𝑅 
should obtain a certificate from CA as well as do 
authentication with MRBS before getting the communication 
to go through. 𝑅 are also allowed to select their own 𝐸 and 𝐵 
for each communication as they are responsible for each node 
under their coverage area.  
  
III. EEOP CRYPTOSYSTEM  
 
Algorithm 1 presents the proposed EEoP based signature 
verification scheme. EEoP is based on ECC + ElGamal and 
PKI. EEoP makes an assumption that (1) a handshake should 
have occurred between MRBS and CA to obtain its public 
key and private key pairs that is generated by MRBS instead 
of CA to avoid CA impersonation attack and reducing the 
load of generating keys on CA for everyone. (2) The 
certificate is created using ECC plus ElGamal algorithm. 
(3)Selection of Elliptic curve and the base point on curve is 
decided by CA and is updated on daily basis while the 
selected key size is greater than 356 bits. This research shows 
a communication between a MRBS and CA for 
authentication purpose. 
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Algorithm 1:  EEOP Scheme for Signature Verification 
 
Pre-condition: Certificate should be issued from certification authority CA 
AT MRBS 
Step 1: Select secret key  𝐾𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 
Step 2: Compute  Public key   𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = (𝑋𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 ,  𝑌𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆) 
Step 3: Compute Hash of Cipher text  𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆) 
Step 4: Sign the Hash  𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = 𝐾𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆
−1 (𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 + 𝑡 ∗ 𝐾𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆  ) 
 
AT 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑅 
Step 5: Compute the two Hashes 
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1 =  (𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 ∗ PMRBS) = (𝑋𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1, 𝑌𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1)  
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘2 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆)𝐺 + [𝑋𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆. 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆] 
= (𝑋𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 2, 𝑌𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘2) 
Step 6: If both hashes matches then message integrity is not compromised else compromised 
 
 
First step is the calculation of secret key 𝑲𝑴𝑹𝑩𝑺 by MRBS 
for communication. There secret key selected must be inside 
the field points out of 𝑁 𝑝𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑠 where 𝑁 are field points on 
Elliptic curve 𝐸 for field 𝐹𝑁 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 1 <  𝐾𝑆𝑁 < 𝑁 − 1. Second 
step is to calculate the public key 𝑷𝑴𝑹𝑩𝑺 = (𝑿𝑴𝑹𝑩𝑺,  𝒀𝑴𝑹𝑩𝑺). 
The public key is calculated by multiplying the secret key 
with based point 𝐵. 
For the authentication purpose, the public and private key 
pair that are generated with CA are used. Initially Cipher text 
𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 is calculated (explained in Algorithm 2). Once the 
cipher text is available then the Hash of cipher text  𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 is 
calculated. For hash SHA3 V3 will be used. The purpose of 
making sure that data integrity is not compromised. Once the 
Hash is calculated, the signature  𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 will be calculated that 
uses the private key of MRBS point multiplication with point 
XMRBS. The result is then point added with  𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 and taken 
then drawing a tangent at point X. The result is referred as 
 𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 as shown in Equation 1. 
 
 𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = 𝑡 (𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 + 𝑐𝑎𝑡𝑙 ∗ 𝐾𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆  ) (1) 
 
The signature  𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 along with cipher text 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 is send 
to 𝑅 that will then find the authenticity of message. In order 
to verify the integrity of Message the received data is verified 
by 𝑅.   It uses 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆  𝑎𝑛𝑑 𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 for calculating the hash 
𝐻𝑐ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1  as shown in equation 2 and then verify the hash re-
calculation 𝐻𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 using cipher text 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆, public key 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 
and XMRBS as shown in Equation 3. All operations are 
performed using modulus L in order to stay in Field of Elliptic 
curve. 
 
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1 =  (𝑆𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 ∗ PMRBS) =
(𝑋𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1, 𝑌𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1) 
(2) 
𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘2 = 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ(𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆)𝐺 + [𝑋𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆. 𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆] =
(𝑋𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘 2, 𝑌𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘2) 
(3) 
 
If two hash 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1and 𝐻𝑎𝑠ℎ𝐶ℎ𝑒𝑐𝑘1are equal then the 
data is from legitimate source else the data integrity has been 
compromised. Now the cipher text can be decrypted to obtain 
the Original message. 
 
Algorithm 2:  EEoP Scheme for Encryption 
 
Pre-condition: Certificate should be issued from certification authority CA 
AT 𝑅𝑒𝑙𝑎𝑦 𝑅 
Step 1: Select secret key  𝐾𝑆𝑁 
Step 2: Compute  Temporal Public key   TSPR = 𝐾𝑆𝑁 ∗ 𝐵 
 
AT MRBS 
Step 3: Select secret key  𝐾𝑆𝑀 
Step 4: Compute  Temporal Public key   TSPMRBS = 𝐾𝑆𝑀 ∗ 𝐵 
Step 5: Calculate 𝑃𝑁𝑇 = 𝐾𝑆𝑀 ∗ TSPR (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝐵) 
Step 6: Encrypt the Message 𝑀 to get the Cipher 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 
𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = (𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆−𝑋 , 𝐶𝑅𝑀𝐵𝑆−𝑌 𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝐵 
 
 
Algorithm 2 shows the ECC + ElGamal algorithm key 
sharing and process of encryption of text in a systematic 
process. The process is simple where initially 𝑅 select a secret 
key 𝐾𝑆𝑁 as a random number where 1 <  𝐾𝑆𝑁 < 𝑁 − 1 as 
shown in Equation 4. The Elliptic curve 𝐸 and base point 𝐵 
are already shared by MRBS in periodic broadcast to reduce 
huge traffic load that will be created on MRBS. 
 
Select a random integer 𝐾𝑆𝑁 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 1 <  𝐾𝑆𝑁 < 𝑁 − 1 (4) 
 
Once the private key 𝐾𝑆𝑁 is selected the next iteration is to 
calculate the public key we call in this algorithm as temporal 
public key as after each defined time the keys are updated. 
So, Temporal Public Key for 𝑅  will be TSPR and will be 
calculated using Equation 5 
𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑅 = 𝐾𝑆𝑁 ∗ 𝐵 (5) 
 
Now 𝑅 send its public key TPSR to MRBS. MRBS then 
selects its private key using same rules mentioned in Equation 
4.  In order to calculate the public key TSPMRBS for itself 
the private key in point multiplied by base point 𝐵  as shown 
in Equation 6.  
 
𝑇𝑆𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = 𝐾𝑆𝑀 ∗ 𝐵 (6) 
 
Now that public key and private key are there, the point at 
which communication will occur has to be calculated. For this 
Elliptic curve, affine group property must be considered. That 
means, the public key of NTP is point multiplied with MRBS 
private key or public key of NTP multiplied with private key 
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of NTP should result in same secret communication point as 
shown in Equation 7.  
 
𝑃𝑁𝑇 = 𝐾𝑆𝑀 ∗ TSPR (𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝐵)  
=  𝐾𝑆𝑁 ∗ TSPMRBS (mod B)  
= (𝑋𝑆𝑀𝑁, 𝑌𝑆𝑀𝑁) 
(7) 
 
Once the points are calculated now the cipher text 
𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆  can be calculated using the point calculation through 
ECC based point multiplication (repeated point doubling) as 
shown in Equation 8. 
 
𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 = (𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆−𝑋, 𝐶𝑅𝑀𝐵𝑆−𝑌) 
Whereas 𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆−𝑋 = (𝑋𝑆𝑀𝑁 ∗ 𝑋𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝐵 & 
𝐶𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆−𝑌 = (𝑌𝑆𝑀𝑁 ∗ 𝑌𝑜𝑟𝑖𝑔𝑖𝑛𝑎𝑙)𝑚𝑜𝑑 𝐵 
(8) 
 
The cipher is calculated using the common secret key point 
and is shared with NRT. All the operations are kept in 
modulus B in order to keep the points in between field. The 
cipher text is used in Algorithm 1. 
 
IV. DISCUSSION AND ANALYSIS 
 
Baseline authentication procedure as shown in Figure 2(a) 
is a minimum four-step process where authentication request 
and response are first two steps while in other two steps, 
secret key is transferred along with acknowledgment. Couple 
of works like Chaudhry et.al, [18] presented improved-SIP 
require six-step authentication scheme while Mohit, Amin & 
Biswas [19] presented a seven step authentication 
mechanism, while compared to our EEoP scheme that only 
require two steps. 
EEoP as shown in Figure 2(b), request for communication 
is sent from R to MRBS and then MRBS send the response 
along with verified authentication. EEoP is just a two-step 
process compared to other scheme. 
If we consider baseline communication step in 
authentication scheme it will need the cost for each session 
using Capkun equation will be session cost 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇  .  
 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑇 = ∑(𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑞)
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ ∑(𝐴𝑅𝑒𝑠) + ∑(𝐴𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑛
𝑖=0
+ ∑(𝐴𝑐𝑘)
𝑛
𝑖=0
 (9) 
 
where 𝑖 is the session number and 𝑛 are total session number 
while EEoP scheme will have cost of communication 𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃 
as shown in Equation 10 will be only for request and response 
while the response includes the message , acknowledgment 
and freshness that were not the part of baseline scheme. 
 
𝐶𝐶𝑜𝑠𝑡𝑃 = ∑(𝑅𝑒𝑞) + ∑(𝑅𝑒𝑠)
𝑛
𝑖=0
𝑛
𝑖=0
 (10) 
 
 
Figure 2: (a) Baseline authentication protocol & (b) EEoP method of authentication with secure communication 
 
The result shows that EEoP reduces the computational cost 
and provide better security and authentication. It also shows 
the viability of solution for limited power and computational 
devices. The technique can be used in current cellular 
network to support secure D2D communication. 
From the first baseline protocol ULMAP [20] which is only 
based on NFC and RFID tag authentication for small number 
of devices, the second base line scheme Improved SIP [18] is 
only based on ECC and rely of number of messages 
transferred between them. 
 
 
 
Figure 3: Showing communication cost comparison of EEoP with baseline protocols 
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Table 1 
Security comparison for EEoP, ULMAP and Improved SIP protocol 
 
  ULMAP EEoP Improved SIP 
Number of Authentication 
messages 
4 2 6 
Database size 
Small and should be 
preconfigured 
Independent for any device joining 
Independent for any device 
joining 
Quantum Attacks Yes No Yes 
Key size Doesn’t focus 
Smaller in size but have higher effect, secondly 
it is variable depending on the scenario 
Smaller in size but have higher 
effect. Fixed size key 
Hashing Algorithm XOR SHA V3 XOR 
Can be used by IoT Devices? 
Yes (but only in predefined 
conditions) 
Yes Yes (but it is heavier to work with 
Figure 3 shows that when no of devices increases the 
communication cost will increase but EEoP outperforms in 
terms of cost compared to baseline protocols. 
The proposed algorithm also uses a better and secure 
hashing algorithm SHA V3 provably quantum secure. 
Moreover, our proposed algorithm is used hybrid scheme to 
overcome the problems of each scheme that are subject to 
attacks. Table 1 shows that EEoP outperforms in term of 
security and mitigation against attack compared to baseline 
protocols. 
EEoP scheme allows the usage of lightweight algorithm to 
secure the communication and solve the problem of 
authentication as well as rouge relay. ECC is provably 
lightweight then other schemes as shown in Table 2 based on 
results obtained in [21-23]. It shows the number of bit 
required as key to be used for encryption or authentication.  
 
Table 2 
Key size comparison  
 
ECC RSA/DH/DSA 
112 512 
163 1024 
224 2048 
283 3072 
409 7680 
571 15360 
 
ECC is based on the Elliptic curve over the finite field and 
requires arithmetic operation over these fields [24]. Elliptic 
curve is based on Abelian group [24] and uses a special form 
of addition and multiplication where addition is point 
addition and multiple is called as point doubling. The 
complexity involved in decryption if the key is not known is 
referred as discrete logarithm problem (DLP). DLP is based 
on principle, that in a known multiplicative group, it is very 
difficult to calculate the exponent. DLP equations are of the 
following type, 
 
𝑝𝑥 = 𝐺 (11) 
 
where 𝐺is a known Multiplicative Group; 𝑝 is a generator 
term from 𝐺; 𝑥 is an element such that 𝑥 ∈ 𝐺. 
DLP says how to x in Equation 11 when p and G are known. 
It requires calculation of logarithm i.e. log𝐺 𝑝 for finding x 
referring this as DLP [25]. There are two categories of 
adversaries, which can attack on proposed EEoP 
cryptosystems. That would use the public key generation 
algorithm defined in equation 5. It have already the public key 
and extract private key from it. Adversary pretends to be a 
legitimate device to achieve M-I-T-M attack. 
 
A. Security Analysis 
There are number of attacks on EEoP that can be made. 
Most common attack is brute force attack that can be done by 
adversary ‘a’, as stated by algorithm 2 that public key 𝑃, 
elliptic curve 𝐸 and base point 𝐵 can be known to rouge 
relay 𝑅. 
 
B. Brute force / Linear search attack 
The adversary know the calculation of public key using the 
equation P = 𝑘 ∗ 𝐵, Here 𝑃 and 𝐵 are known to adversary 𝑅 
that will use the different values of 𝑘 to find 𝑃. As known that 
elliptic curve uses point addition and point multiplication.  
Thus different values of k can be inserted to find 𝑃 where 
𝑘 has to be repeatedly point multiplied in Elliptic curve 𝐸. 
Requiring linear steps to find will be 𝑂(𝑛) that seems to be 
computationally impossible. Our assumption of algorithm is 
based on key size of 571bits for certification purpose that is 
equal to 15360bits in binary scheme. Thus, requiring 215360 
maximum number of times to be conducted to find secret key 
that seems virtually impossible. EEoP algorithm share 
different keys for sending message that is referred as temporal 
key that will be on size 256 that is equivalent to 3072bits in 
binary system so total number of steps to crack a message will 
require 
  
𝑇𝐶 = 𝑡𝑘𝑒𝑦𝐶𝐴 [𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐾𝐸𝑌] 
 
where 𝑡𝑡𝑒𝑚𝑝𝐾𝐸𝑌 is changed after each communication session 
𝑠. Thus 𝑖𝑓 𝑠 > 𝑡𝐶 then a key can be found but this means in 
our case session will be more than 𝑋 𝑤ℎ𝑒𝑟𝑒 𝑋 𝑖𝑠 𝑣𝑒𝑟𝑦 𝑙𝑎𝑟𝑔𝑒 
years that is nearly impossible. For baseline protocol ULMAP 
the linear search attack can be done while for improved-SIP 
is also based on ECC but is based on fixed 512 bits key size 
that will be make computational overhead but EEoP 
outperforms this as it uses varaibale key size for sessions. 
 
C. M-I-T-M Attack 
Let’s consider Needam-schroder protocol [26] for M-I-T-
M attack in our MRBS and 𝑅 case. 
 
𝑹𝟏 → 𝑹𝟐 
𝑹𝟏 → 𝑹𝟐   𝑲𝑹𝟏(𝑷𝑴𝑹𝑩𝑺 , 𝑴𝑹𝑩𝑺) 
 
Here instead of 𝑅2 some rouge relay can use its private key 
and send the public key of some other device for 
communication. As public key of 𝑅2 will be obtained through 
CA using the following method thus a chance of rouge-relay 
in between is failed. 
 
𝑅2 → 𝐶𝐴 
𝐶𝐴 → 𝑅2      𝐾𝐶𝐴(𝑃𝑅1, 𝑅1) 
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𝑅2    𝐷𝑃𝑅1(𝐾𝑅1(𝑃𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆 , 𝑀𝑅𝐵𝑆) 
 
It is seen in above equations that M-I-T-M will fail as the 
key is directly obtained from the CA with an assumption that 
CA is not rouge. In future, this algorithm will be extended to 
certificate-less authentication reducing the overhead cost 
posed by EEoP.  
 
D. Baby Step, Giant Step (BSGS) Method  
BSGS [27] method is one of fastest methods where it is 
used to solve DLP problem that is considered to strength of 
EEoP. BSGS makes an assumption that it can be applied to 
any group. Thus, algorithm will need  𝐹𝑁  field points [28] to 
be calculated and store. It requires at least √𝑁 time of space 
and √𝑁 space where N is very large so √2𝑏𝑖𝑡𝑠 wherein our 
case bits are 15360 then 3072 are very large so thus 
machining it computationally infeasible to calculate the secret 
key.    
EEoP proves to be a secure protocol that can handle M-I-
T-M attack.  Its security it higher than ECC or DH or ElGamal 
algorithm due to introduction of session keys during the 
communication that will be updated at each session while 
update with CA is done periodically in time t where t is < 40 
hours , thus making extremely complex for attacker to do the 
guess attack even if quantum computers are uses. Moreover, 
if the M-I-T-M can be avoided then Interleaving attack will 
also be avoided. Rouge relays cannot act in our proposed 
model due to verification of CA for each device.  
 
V. CONCLUSION 
 
Device-to-Device communication is filling a gap of 
connectivity and bandwidth where small devices having low 
computational capabilities like the mobile phone can provide 
connectivity to nearby devices in the area just acting like a 
small base station of a cellular network. These small semi-
intelligent devices are also called as semi-intelligent relays. If 
these small devices can be allowed to become a semi-
intelligent relay, integrity and confidentiality are a major 
concern that has raised. In order to address these two 
challenges, EEoP scheme is proposed that used Elliptic curve 
cryptography with ElGamal over PKI. It will solve two issues 
(1) it is a lightweight security algorithm that allows secure 
transmission of data with authentication over the cellular 
network (2) Rouge Relay problem cannot exit. ECC is a 
lightweight mechanism compared to their predecessor RSA 
and Diffie Hellman, Also ElGamal addresses the 
shortcomings of Diffie Hellman. It also uses X.509 
certificates before initial communication in cellular network 
making sure that authenticity is always ensured. The 
proposed solution solves the problem of authentication and 
confidentiality with limited computational resources. In 
future, the proposed scheme will be compared with known 
schemes employed in other areas. In addition, this research 
intends to use certificate less key sharing authentication 
scheme in the future. 
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